Are there atheists on earth?
There are atheists neither in heaven nor hell. But are there any on earth either?
An atheist is a person who does not believe in God. By this definition an atheist need not reject God's existence. He merely has to believe not. (An analogy might be helpful. A child who is unaware of a place commonly called China surely doesn't believe China exists. It's not that the child actively rejects China's existence. Rather, he simply doesn't affirm China in his thinking. His unbelief we might say is merely passive. He simply doesn't assent to China. How could he?)
Romans 1 couldn't be more clear. All men know God. So much so, all are without excuse and culpable before Him. Since belief is a condition of knowledge (for what can be known that's not also believed?), we may safely conclude that if all men know God, then all men must believe He is. Given our definition of an atheist, on God's authority we can know there are none anywhere. There is no actual unbelief - neither active nor passive. There's only a suppression of knowledge. (Yet if that were all there is to this post, we needn't light the fire or the cigar, let alone measure out any corn juice. Indeed, we must do better.)
O.K., so there are no true atheists, but are there any true creedal atheists? In other words, those who articulate their denial of God, do they deny true predicates of God? We know they suppress them, but does their creedal denial reflect the God they know yet suppress? At first glance we might say "yes." And maybe that's correct. Or is it? Is an a-theistic profession a rejection of a deity that is so far from God that it's not a denial of the true and living God but rather a denial of a god who is fashioned by man and, therefore, in his finite image as well? Do men profess to reject the God who is the necessary precondition for their denial of him? If not, do they reject enough truth - in their creed - to be speaking out against the true and living God? Again, we know they believe in and suppress God, but what does their creed say in this regard?
Let's discuss on Friday, September 15, 7:30 PM.
A summary of last night's discussion is now in the comments box.
An atheist is a person who does not believe in God. By this definition an atheist need not reject God's existence. He merely has to believe not. (An analogy might be helpful. A child who is unaware of a place commonly called China surely doesn't believe China exists. It's not that the child actively rejects China's existence. Rather, he simply doesn't affirm China in his thinking. His unbelief we might say is merely passive. He simply doesn't assent to China. How could he?)
Romans 1 couldn't be more clear. All men know God. So much so, all are without excuse and culpable before Him. Since belief is a condition of knowledge (for what can be known that's not also believed?), we may safely conclude that if all men know God, then all men must believe He is. Given our definition of an atheist, on God's authority we can know there are none anywhere. There is no actual unbelief - neither active nor passive. There's only a suppression of knowledge. (Yet if that were all there is to this post, we needn't light the fire or the cigar, let alone measure out any corn juice. Indeed, we must do better.)
O.K., so there are no true atheists, but are there any true creedal atheists? In other words, those who articulate their denial of God, do they deny true predicates of God? We know they suppress them, but does their creedal denial reflect the God they know yet suppress? At first glance we might say "yes." And maybe that's correct. Or is it? Is an a-theistic profession a rejection of a deity that is so far from God that it's not a denial of the true and living God but rather a denial of a god who is fashioned by man and, therefore, in his finite image as well? Do men profess to reject the God who is the necessary precondition for their denial of him? If not, do they reject enough truth - in their creed - to be speaking out against the true and living God? Again, we know they believe in and suppress God, but what does their creed say in this regard?
Let's discuss on Friday, September 15, 7:30 PM.
A summary of last night's discussion is now in the comments box.
Comments
We spent a bit of time trying to define belief. I suggested belief is intellectual assent to something. I think that captures "the attitude of regarding something to be true." One person paraphrased it as “acceptance” of something, which in colloquial sense seemed quite good to me at the time. It still does. In common parlance to accept something is to regard it as true. Given subsequent discussion about how the faculty of choice, the will, might relate to belief, this morning I thought that it might have been appropriate to nuance that a bit further last evening. In a more technical sense “acceptance” pertains to one’s beliefs that are relied upon, which does not pertain to all beliefs (arguably even most beliefs). No big deal, as a clear enough distinction was made between relied upon beliefs and other sorts of beliefs. The former sort engaging the will in a reliance / trust sense.
Although the will is active or engaged in relying upon certain beliefs, some went further even positing that beliefs are not only relied upon but also chosen. An illustration from last night might be useful here. My guess was most people believe that trains are generally reliable. They typically run on time. Although I assent to the proposition, on a day to day basis I personally don’t rely on that belief, whereas commuters from Philadelphia to Washington D.C. indeed often do. In this context some not only thought that commuters rely on their belief about the timeliness of trains, it was posited that they actually choose their belief that trains are reliable. Once one chooses his belief, he can rely upon it.
Although we didn’t define choice, I find no reason to question that we were all operating from the basic perspective that a choice is basically an act of making a decision or selection between alternatives. The decision process could be intuitive, even lightning fast, but nonetheless a choice must entail a decision, some deliberation (or discursive reasoning) over alternatives.
It was thought by some that one doesn’t just believe a fire is in front of him, we choose to believe it when believed. A willful decision is at play. Against that view, it was argued that if beliefs are chosen, then an infinite regress would obtain. An infinite regress cannot obtain. Therefore, beliefs aren’t chosen. Q.E.D.
Those who held to the notion that beliefs are chosen fell into two categories. There were those who denied that chosen beliefs imply infinite regress, and there were those who were accepting of an infinite regress. Subsets of the first category would include those who might deny infinite regress yet allow for regression to a terminus point and others who deny all regress yet still maintain choice of belief.
I was pleased and stimulated by the thoughtful and congenial discussion.
Points for further reflection:
Allowing for “I choose to believe proposition x, a fire is in front of me,” I summarize here the following considerations from last evening. Using above mentioned definitions of choice and belief, we can say "I decide to regard as true a fire is in front of me." (Decision refers to the choice, whereas regarding as true refers to the belief).
Added to that, to believe x, I must first understand the meaning of x.
The belief under discussion involved understanding (or “comprehending” as some might have preferred) the proposition x, a fire is in front of me. (As one person noted, when belief obtains there must be an object of belief; yet belief in an object presupposes comprehension of its meaning. For what is it to believe something we don’t comprehend at least minimally?) In passing I referenced the classical view of notitia, assensus and fiducia. Our belief or assent to the truth must always have content and in some instances we also trust or rely upon what is believed, like in saving faith.
In this context, three fundamental laws of logic were referred to in brief. To understand (the meaning) of proposition x entails at least believing (likely subconsciously): x and not x are not both true; either x or not x must be true; and x is x (and not something other than x). Without those innate laws of reason, what is it to believe x? Consider, can I believe a fire is in front of me if I don’t intuitively believe that there cannot be both a fire in front of me and not a fire in front of me? Mustn’t I intuitively believe that there is either a fire in front of me or there isn’t? Mustn’t I believe that a fire is a fire as opposed to, say, a tomato? Although we might not be conscious of these sorts of beliefs, they seem hardly controversial. The question is whether one chooses such beliefs. That generated some fine discussion.
So, understanding is requisite for belief. Yet understanding x entails belief that x is x; x is not not-x and either x or not x is true. If those beliefs are chosen, then there must be preceding beliefs (reasons that are believed) lest there is no basis upon which to choosethose beliefs. Yet if they're "chosen" apart from belief, then they're not choices at all.
Food for thought…. does man possess the natural ability to choose not to believe such laws of logic?(Keep in mind, although man cannot choose contrary to what God decrees, man nonetheless possesses the natural ability to do so when a choice is made. Man has liberty but not libertarian free will.) So, if man doesn’t possess the natural ability to disbelieve the law of identity for instance, then what does it mean that a choice is made to believe x is x? Don’t choices require a decision between real possible world alternatives? Can I choose not to flap my arms and fly or is no choice even available to me in this regard? What is it to decide upon x when there’s no other possible alternative to x?
Allowing for the notion of chosen beliefs, wouldn’t any attempt to deny such beliefs require the affirmation of the contrary through the employment of argumentation, which is intended to employ these very laws that are supposedly subject to disbelief? In other words, how can one disbelieve that which must first be believed in order to argue for such disbelief? More simply, does one have the natural ability to choose not to believe he sees a fire when he indeed sees a fire? Are we sovereign over our beliefs in this way?
The infinite regress conundrum...
There must be reason(s) to choose x, call it y. Do I believe those reasons or not? For argument sake, assume y includes, “I believe my senses are reliable and I sense (and believe I sense) a fire is in front of me.” Let those be reasons to choose x belief. Wouldn’t it stand to reason that my choice to believe x would be predicated upon my senses that I believe are reliable.
My alleged willful decision to believe a fire is before me would have to be predicated on something I already must infer to be the case, would it not? Yet how can such an inference not entail belief? At the very least, if the inference itself isn't believed, surely the plausibility of the inference must be. Is belief in the plausibility of the inference chosen? If so, what beliefs must precede such an alleged choice for it to be an intended act of the will? In other words, don't we choose between alternatives in accordance to beliefs? If not, then what is it to choose something that's not believed? Yet if I must believe in at least the plausibility of a fire in front of me in order that I might somehow choose to believe it is true, then am I choosing the plausibility-belief? Wouldn't that belief upon which I decided to believe have to be chosen, assuming beliefs are indeed chosen? Yet the rationale or reasons to choose that more previous belief would surely be predicated upon some other more previous beliefs(s), ad infinitum.
I may have detected a middle ground that *might* have seemed plausible to some, one that would avoid an infinite regress, at least on the surface. It allowed for some regression but hard-stopped at preconditions for intelligible experience. Is there an insurmountable problem that is the same? If I may even put it in such a construct, choosing to believe x requires belief that x is true else why choose it? Yet if x must be believed first, then what does it mean that it's chosen?
For sake of time here I’ll just say that it’s my contention that most of the things we assent to, whether a priori or a posteriori, are non-volitional in nature. Some assents have a voluntary aspect to them indeed, but that too must be nuanced further.
Although some beliefs involve a voluntary *aspect* I don't believe that *any* belief is chosen. I do believe that choices and experience can nurture and quench beliefs (i.e. Influence and cause them), hence there is an *aspect* of choice with respect to belief formation, like when choices are proximate causes giving rise to new beliefs. I see no reasons to make room for even a moderate form of doxastic voluntarism.
In closing, I'd submit that one does not will to believe that God exists any more than a child chooses to believe he is being fed by his mother. These, I believe, are mental assents that are not discursive; they are immediate and without reflection. The will is bypassed.